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Overview
•
 
Terminology and Context
•
 
Analytical framework:
–
 
Why contract?
–
 
When is ownership (i.e. integration) to be preferred
•
 
Contracting problems in electricity systems
•
 
Advantages of vertical integration
•
 
Policy implications
Terminology
•
 
Long-term contracts (LTCs) are any contracts for 
electricity supply of longer duration than spot energy 
supply –
 
we call the use of such contracts “contracting”
•
 
Vertical integration (VI):
–
 
Arises when electricity generators or their customers (i.e. 
energy retailers, industrial firms) or fuel suppliers own each 
other to some degree
–
 
Is assumed precluded between competitive and 
monopoly/network (i.e. grid, lines) activities
•
 
Decentralised (liberalised) electricity markets are those 
relying on competition rather than “design”, with pricing 
and investment decisions made by private parties
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Context – cont’d
•
 
Reformers initially focused on:
–
 
Constraining generator market power and promoting retail competition
–
 
Shifting investment risks from consumers/taxpayers to investors
•
 
LTC markets and retail entry have not emerged as expected, and 
generation investment has suffered from retailer defaults and falling 
investor confidence
•
 
Now reformers are increasingly concerned with supply security and 
hence encouraging investment:
–
 
“Missing money”
 
problem in some decentralised markets
–
 
“Hold-up”
 
problems –
 
customers reneging on contracts when prices change, 
leaving counterparties (e.g. generators) with stranded long-term 
investments
–
 
Bankruptcies and “inadequate”
 
investment (with associated political 
“twitchiness”
 
about keeping the lights on)
•
 
VI is emerging other than by design
 
–
 
makes regulators suspicious 
about thinning contracts markets, entry deterrence, over-pricing …
Why contract? (vs Spot trading)
•
 
In general:
–
 
To reduce transaction costs from repeated spot contracting
–
 
To manage input and output price and quantity risks –
 
e.g. 
securing supply at a predictable price/margin (especially 
where such risks are correlated)
–
 
As a commitment device (albeit imperfect), e.g.:
•
 
To manage investment risk –
 
e.g. to better align demand with 
investment horizons, reducing hold-up risks for long-lived assets
•
 
To constrain market power –
 
where parties have counter-veiling 
power (e.g. large customers, retailers)
•
 
In decentralised electricity systems –
 
as above, plus:
–
 
To smooth the transition to competitive electricity markets
–
 
To facilitate competitive retail entry
–
 
To offload legacy contracts previously entered into by 
liberalising states (e.g. with large industrials)
Why integrate? (vs Contracting)
•
 
When the costs/risks of market contracting
 
exceed those of 
ownership? optimally, ownership should fall to the firm 
patrons (i.e. suppliers, customers, etc) that enjoy the lowest 
sum of such costs – does liberalisation even allow this …?
•
 
Relevant costs of ownership include:
–
 
Agency costs –
 
arising when ownership and control are separated
–
 
Costs of collective decision-making
–
 
Costs of risk bearing (diversification/capital access)
•
 
Relevant costs of market contracting include:
–
 
Transaction costs
–
 
Contractual incompleteness and bounded rationality –
 
especially when 
forecasting future supply and demand is hard
–
 
Hold-up costs
–
 
Market power costs (if they cannot be contracted away) –
 
especially if 
parties have asymmetric information
–
 
Regulatory risks –
 
these differ by owner
Contracting problems in electricity markets
•
 
Need for continuous real-time balance presents 
highly volatile demand and wholesale prices ?
worsened with uncertain plant and fuel availability, 
unpredictable weather, inelastic demand, …
•
 
Hold-up risks, e.g. due to:
–
 
Differing generator and customer investment/contracting 
horizons, driven by risk of competitive predation in 
customer output markets:
•
 
Retailers –
 
tend to prefer short-term only
•
 
Industrial customers –
 
sometimes prefer longer contracts
–
 
Liberalisation itself, and regulation (especially of LTCs!)
–
 
Degree of diversification –
 
i.e. plant/fuel/customers for 
generators; generators/load profiles for customers
Contracting problems – cont’d
•
 
Other contracting problems include:
–
 
Adverse selection risks –
 
due to market power, asymmetric 
information and bounded rationality
–
 
Contract market illiquidity –
 
due to non-storability and 
locational pricing, and asynchronous energy/
 transmission auctions (complicating arbitrage), or VI
–
 
Outages, fuel risk and load profiles –
 
force majeure clauses 
vs call options, base vs peak preferences, cyclical loads
–
 
Relative risk aversion –
 
affects contracting appetite of 
generators and customers
–
 
Initial conditions –
 
e.g. excess capacity, vesting contracts, 
pre-existing LTCs (e.g. with industrials)
Benefits of vertical integration
•
 
Contrary to common fears, evidence and theory point to VI not just 
improving investment and risk management, but also reducing 
wholesale market power and supporting retail competition
•
 
VI provides a natural and self sustaining hedge against wholesale price 
and quantity risks, as well as market power and asymmetric information 
costs –
 
VI (mostly) internalises these risks and costs to the firm
•
 
VI reduces regulatory risk –
 
rationale for and ability to regulate 
wholesale prices is reduced, as such prices are marginalised, and other 
relevant variables (e.g. generation costs) are not observable
•
 
VI enables better matching of load profile and supply security 
preferences (e.g. cogeneration by industrials, or peaking investment by 
retailers)
•
 
By thinning contracts markets, integration:
–
 
Reduces the risk of retail entry (tying entry to owning generation as well), 
fundamentally reducing hold-up risks!
–
 
Enhances scale differences between integrated firms and retail entrants, 
reducing integrated firms’
 
exposure to predation
Benefits of VI – cont’d
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Benefits of VI – cont’d
•
 
A possible virtue of transmission constraints in systems with 
nodal pricing:
–
 
Price separation without effective congestion hedges complicates
 contracting, and deters retail entry and hence reduces retail hold-up risks
–
 
However, for integrated firms with capacity above and below 
constraints customers can still achieve hedged supply (and 
constraints can also be gamed to deter predation)
•
 
A possible virtue of hydro-exposed systems –
 
e.g. New Zealand 
(65% hydro, low storage, volatile inflows) –
 
wholesale price 
surges in “dry years”
 
are long-lived:
–
 
Complicates contracting, but of marginal impact on integrated firms
–
 
Means price caps are less viable, and helps to resolve the missing 
money problem
•
 
Claim: VI is better able than contracting to sustain any given level of 
retail competition, given its advantages in terms of supporting 
investment, managing risks and mitigating generator market power
Benefits of VI – cont’d
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Policy implications
•
 
VI is often seen as anti-competitive, and undermining contract markets ?
this presumes you are committed to contracting and that VI is precluded
•
 
On closer examination some of the “problems”
 
of VI are non-existent, 
shared with contracting, or are natural solutions to shortcomings in LTCs 
(which LTCs often arise by design rather than by evolution)
•
 
VI, LTCs and spot trading should be seen as natural complements
•
 
Some authors propose regulating for contracts to remedy contracting 
deficiencies, but this possibly imposes an inefficient approach instead of 
permitting efficient VI to evolve
•
 
Other authors propose the retention/reinstatement of franchise areas to 
remove hold-up risk from “excessive”
 
retail competition, but this:
–
 
Presumes contracting is required, and that VI cannot resolve the
 
problem 
–
 
May be necessary absent VI, or other system features constraining 
competition (e.g. grid constraints) or assisting investment (e.g. no price caps 
and sustained scarcity rents as in hydro-exposed systems) –
 
but is extreme
–
 
Could similarly be proposed for industrial customer output markets to 
reduce hold-up risks, but that would be very extreme!
Policy implications – cont’d
•
 
These proposals do, however, highlight the need to re-evaluate the 
optimal degree of retail competition –
 
given a system’s characteristics –
 and also the optimal approach to achieving that competition
•
 
Such a re-evaluation needs to weigh short-term consumer protection 
against long-term consumer welfare (i.e. investment, not just entry)
•
 
This is a tricky political calculus, fundamentally affecting the
 
prospect of 
successful liberalisation, and requiring a departure from the often-cited 
motivation of reform (i.e. to introduce competition)
•
 
Alternatives such as capacity requirements or capacity mechanisms 
suffer the weaknesses that they are intended to remedy (and others)
•
 
A more tolerant approach to integration, sober assessment of the
 
role 
of contracting, and pragmatic approach to retail competition is likely to 
provide a natural and self-sustaining approach to supporting both 
investment and competition in decentralised systems
Thank You –
 
Any Questions?
